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Contemporary Socio-Political Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment 
 
ABDULKHALEQ ABDULLA∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper introduces the Gulf moment in contemporary Arab history and 
examines some of the key internal socio-political issues that are at the 
forefront of the intellectual and academic debate in the Arab Gulf States 
(AGS). The central questions addressed in this paper revolve around whether 
much of the new thinking is in essence old thinking. What accounts for the 
suppressed demand for political reform? How did the business-friendly UAE 
model manage recently to outshine the more politically mature Kuwait model 
of development? What are the gains and the pains of going global, and have 
the AGS transcended their chronic dependence on oil and witnessed the end 
of the rentier state structure and mentality? The paper concludes that the way 
the AGS handle these pertinent questions will not only determine the future 
direction of the Gulf moment but ultimately decide the AGS’s ability to 
reshape the geo-economics and geo-politics of the region, and to set in 
motion a process for the Gulfanization of the Arab world. 
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1. INTRODUCING THE GULF MOMENT  
This is the Arab Gulf moment in contemporary Arab history. The six mostly small but 
oil-rich states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates (the Arab Gulf states or AGS) are taking the lead, influencing events, 
assuming greater financial responsibilities, projecting socioeconomic confidence, and 
becoming increasingly conscious of their newly acquired status as a regional power 
that far transcends the rest of the Arab countries (Bin Huwedin 2009). Some decades 
ago few would have paid any attention to the AGS. But now these states, individually 
and collectively, have come a long way from their former relative remoteness and 
peripheral status and wield enormous power, mostly soft power as they take centre 
stage in Arab politics and move to the forefront of international finance. What 
distinguishes the AGS at this moment in history is their noticeable political stability, 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank the three anonymous readers for their pertinent comments on the first draft of 
this paper. 
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almost incredible engine of prosperity, consistent moderate ideology, and 
determination to achieve incrementally full economic and monetary integration and 
create their own internationally recognized regional organizations. These are the main 
pillars of the Gulf moment and the so-called ‘New Gulf’ (O’Sullivan 2008), which is 
reshaping the region’s geo-economics and geo-politics and setting in motion a process 
for the Gulfanization of the Arab world.1  
The AGS have a high standard of living and enjoy a comparatively good 
quality of life; the World Bank has classified their economies among the best 
performing, with an average of 5.8 per cent annual growth during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, compared to 4.3 per cent for the world average and 2.3 per 
cent for advanced economies. The 2009 Arab Knowledge Report indicates that 
generous investment in human capital, economic reform and the building of 
information technology infrastructure during the past ten years has increased the 
AGS’s readiness for the knowledge economy, which is needed to compete globally 
(UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation, 2009). The gradual 
emergence of the Gulf moment has led some keen observers to claim that, ‘While the 
outside world has portrayed the Arab world as downtrodden in time, a vigorous 
entrepreneurial leadership has developed in the Gulf area. In places like Dubai, Abu 
Dhabi and Doha, Arabness is chic and not backward’ (Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah and al 
Mutawa 2006: 49). 
Yet even if the AGS continue to flourish and assume a greater leading role in 
Arab politics, as is widely expected, the Gulf moment is not entirely without its 
challenges and shortcomings. The small AGS remain highly vulnerable to regional 
tensions and dependent on foreign protection, mostly American, as they have been 
since 1971. The rapid socioeconomic change of the last three decades has caused 
massive dislocations and disorientations. The current double-digit economic growth 
has come at a daunting social cost, whereby the citizens of these states are becoming a 
disappearing minority in their own countries. The fast pace of globalization, 
spearheaded by ambitious cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi, has raised legitimate 
concerns regarding the concept of citizenship, issues of authenticity and national 
identity, and ultimately the social sustainability of the economic growth strategy of 
the AGS. The real challenge facing the Gulf moment is closely related to the growing 
                                                 
1 David Ottaway (2010) observes that ‘Not only has the center of Arab wealth moved to the Gulf, so 
too, has the source of new initiatives and thinking.’  
3 
 
middle-class demand for good governance and greater democratization. The 
prevailing political stagnation associated with entrenched Gulf monarchies may yet 
prove to be the Achilles heel of the Gulf moment in history.  
Clearly the future direction will be largely decided by how the AGS deal not 
just with the issue of political reform, but also with a set of complex and interrelated 
socio-political challenges of independence, nation building, change and continuity, 
old and new, local and global, oil and post-oil structures, and adjustment to the 
powerful forces unleashed by the process of globalization. 
This paper examines some of the key socio-political issues that are at the 
forefront of the intellectual and academic debate in the AGS at this moment in their 
historical unfolding. The paper shifts the focus of attention towards internal issues, 
that is, towards the domestic debates within rather than the external debates about the 
AGS. The central questions revolve around whether much of the new thinking is, in 
essence, old thinking. What accounts for the suppressed popular demand for political 
reform? How did the business-friendly United Arab Emirates (UAE) model manage 
to outshine the more politically empowering Kuwait model of development? Have the 
AGS finally transcended their unhealthy dependence on oil and are they witnessing 
the end of the rentier state structure and mentality? What remains of national identity 
in the ever problematic situation where the local citizens of the AGS are becoming 
increasingly a disappearing minority in their own countries?  
How the AGS handle these pertinent questions will determine the authenticity 
of the New Gulf, the longevity of the Gulf moment and its future directions.2  
 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE GULF MOMENT 
The complexity of the issues and challenges facing the AGS at this promising 
moment in history requires a search for fresh concepts, as the prevailing approaches 
are those of an inappropriate old model and do not necessarily fit the newly emerging 
                                                 
2 May Yamani (2009) makes a clear distinction between Saudi Arabia, which she calls a ‘Frozen State’, 
and the other, smaller AGS, which she labels ‘Flourishing States’. She says ‘Frozen States include 
Saudi Arabia where democracy is omitted from political discourse, even limited partial elections have 
been put on hold, and the royal succession remains a secret kept from the population. Frozen States 
appear more stable in the short term, as oil revenues still buy the subservience and submission of most 
of the subjects, but stability coincides with the possibility of increased violence and civil unrest, owing 
to widespread grievance over sectarian rule. The small AGS are flourishing states that have joined the 
global economy through political and economic reform. Managing social and political inclusion is not 
difficult for states blessed with an advantageous position along one of the world’s major trade routes, a 
tradition of cosmopolitanism and commerce, massive oil wealth, and a small national population.’ 
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realities of the twenty-first century. To understand the AGS’s experiences of the past 
fifty years and the contemporary socio-political issues of the Gulf moment better, it is 
necessary to experiment with simpler theories and approaches, such as the social 
issues-centred perspective.  
There has always been more than one perspective on the rapidly changing, 
rapidly modernizing and rapidly globalizing AGS. However, approaches and concepts 
that have been around since the emergence of the oil-rich AGS on the world stage, 
such as the rentier theory, the oil-monarch concept, the new authoritarian approach, 
the small and microstate state analysis, the modernization school and the dependency 
model, are anachronistic and no longer give credible readings of the current realities 
of the AGS. While helpful in understanding the formative years of independence, the 
initial phases of the oil boom and the turbulent years of the 1980s, most of these 
theoretical formulations have lost the power to describe and explain the peculiarity of 
this Gulf moment. The AGS of the twenty-first century are visibly different from the 
AGS of the twentieth century, and the current issues and challenges have overtaken 
the models of the 1970s and 1980s. This has created a theoretical confusion and 
conceptual vacuum in the writings on the AGS.  
The rentier state school advanced by Luciani and Beblawi (1987) has long 
dominated the literature on the AGS. This theory is responsible for reinforcing the 
exceptionalist view, which asserts that the AGS possess unique economic and socio-
political attributes that are rarely found in any other comparable group of states. 
However, the ‘Gulf uniqueness’ writings and the many variations on this theme, 
including the recent ‘ Dead Ends of transition’ version (Duderstandt and Schildberg 
2006), are hardly as convincing as they used to be. The AGS have long gone beyond 
the stereotypes of the capital surplus and rentier economy, and those of the docile 
citizens and benevolent Gulf monarchies.  
The modernization school, which typically views the AGS as in a state of 
transition from traditional society to modern state, has been less prolific than the 
rentier approach. In a similar way, though, it has failed to yield a comprehensive 
reading of the striking anomaly of economic modernity and lack of political reform in 
the AGS. Even Khaldoun Naqeeb’s (1987) theoretically sophisticated ‘new 
authoritarian’ approach, which rejects the assumptions of both the oil-centred rentier 
view and euro-centred modernization, has not been credible in its assertion that the 
AGS ‘managed, to a large extent, to peacefully transform their traditional 
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authoritarian regimes into modern bureaucratic kingdoms’ (Al Naqeeb 1987: 23). 
This proposition, borrowed from the theoretical literatures on Turkey and Latin 
American, turned out to have had meagre relevance to the Gulf socio-political 
transformation of the past forty years.  
Except for the ‘new authoritarian’ perspective, all the conceptual approaches 
have contributed to the development of what can be labelled the ‘oil/security’ 
paradigm that still dominates the field of Gulf studies. This prevailing paradigm views 
oil as the sole independent variable and as the fundamental catalyst for change in the 
AGS. Oil is made into the only worthy unit of analysis, which explains everything of 
significance. The oil/security paradigm has also developed a fixation with the issue of 
regional security as the sole problematic worthy of serious consideration and 
investigation. Oil is evidently important, but it is far from being the decisive force that 
is shaping present-day realities in the Gulf. Gulf security is a critical issue for the 
AGS, which happen to live next to difficult neighbours and in a region full of 
tensions. Yet regional conflicts aside, the people in the Gulf have other daily socio-
political issues that concern them. Gulf security is understandably of the utmost 
interest to the industrialized world but less so to the citizens of the AGS, who are 
preoccupied with the domestic challenges of rapid change, foreign intervention, 
demographic imbalances, internal violence, extremism, sectarianism, regional 
integration, national identity, creeping corruption, political reform, unemployment 
and equal distribution of wealth. These are more than simple issues; they are firmly 
interconnected forces, challenges and realities shaping policies and politics.  
 The oil/security paradigm that permeates Gulf literature is sadly a reductionist 
view of the region. That is why the Kuwaiti sociologist Muhammad Al Rumayhi had 
to assert that ‘there is more to the Gulf than oil’ (Al Rumayhi 1995). The exclusive 
preoccupation with oil and the security of oil has prevented scholars from a deeper 
examination of the power relationships and social structures that shape and reshape 
politics and society in the AGS. Ironically, the region that is being studied by this 
paradigm has long gone beyond oil/security, whereas the majority of the writings are 
still stuck with oil and oil-security topics. The oil/security paradigm has failed on 
three accounts. First, it has failed to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
domestic Gulf issues. It has neglected the emergence of the new Gulf and the vast 
changes that have taken place in the AGS since 1971. Second, despite its 
concentration on security matters, it has failed to make the region any more secure. 
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Third, and despite its fixation with oil, the oil/security paradigm has failed miserably 
in making oil any more predictable. All of the problems associated with oil and oil 
security persist; the Gulf is no more secure and the world is no less independent of 
Arab Gulf oil.  
 Hence, it is probably time to shift to a less grandiose approach, such as an 
issues-centred view of the AGS. This inchoate approach is highly relevant and more 
interesting than theory-centred studies. The main attraction of this rather simple 
framework is that issues reveal the essence of the moment. Several points distinguish 
issues-centred analysis from the more traditional approaches: issues are identified 
from current social discourse, are used for the collection of useful data, are situational, 
are governed by local conditions and are time sensitive. However, issues also impact 
decision-making processes and influence individual and group behaviours. Above all, 
issues are dynamic, constantly interact with the events of the moment and mutually 
influence each other.  
 An issues-centred approach is based on four major assumptions. First, these 
issues do not exist in isolation but are to be understood in their regional context and 
historical unfolding. Second, the content of the issues is usually organized around 
themes and questions that generate societal debates about long- and short-term 
controversies. Third, educators who apply an issues-centred approach have found that 
a focus on social issues and problems is more fruitful than the study of abstract ideas 
and theories from textbooks. Fourth, issues-centred research is highly 
interdisciplinary and is uniquely eclectic.3  
 Whatever the merits of this approach it is the issues under debate, more than 
anything else, that define the historical moment. That is why the issues-centred 
                                                 
3 For more details on these and other features of issues-centred analysis see Zevin (2007) and Evans 
(1992: 93). See also materials available on the net, such as 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4033/is_200410/ai_n9467567/, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~ssdc/issuedig.htm and  
http://www.naturalborders.com/docs/kpreister_issuecenteredapproach.pdf. 
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approach is more fitting for this paper and may be so for the better understanding of 
this Gulf moment as well as its historical unfolding.  
 
 
3. THE CONTEXT OF THE GULF MOMENT 
Socio-political issues do not exist in a vacuum. They are deeply rooted in their 
realities, interact with their surroundings and continuously shape and become shaped 
by objective conditions and regional and global events. Most of the socio-political 
issues of the Gulf moment have deep roots in the historical turning points of the past 
half century, beginning with the oil discovery of the 1950s, political independence in 
1971, the oil boom of 1973, the turbulent years of the 1980s, the establishment of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the 
advent of globalization during the 1990s and the tragic events of 11 September 2001, 
which exposed the AGS to severe global scrutiny. All these epochal developments 
have had a profound influence on current socio-political issues, and have contributed 
in great measure to the emergence of the current Gulf moment. Since the end of the 
Second World War the Gulf has experienced four major phases: pre-modernity in 
1950–70, the first stage of modernity in 1971–90, the second stage of modernity in 
1990–2010, and finally the global moment of 2010 onwards.  
The starting point of most of the contemporary socio-political issues of the 
AGS is the British colonial legacy in the Gulf and the British withdrawal in 1971. The 
pre-modernity phase is essentially linked to the nearly 150 years of British 
involvement in Gulf affairs. Britain was the sole power, and unilaterally tampered 
with the social and political realities in the region. It changed rulers, imposed artificial 
borders,4 prevented change, and basically preserved the existing tribal order (Qasim, 
n.d.). Many of the socio-political dilemmas created by Britain continue to exist well 
into the twenty-first century. They decisively influence issues of change and 
continuity, political reform and stagnation and the various developmental options 
confronting the AGS. When Britain suddenly decided to remove its direct military 
presence from the Gulf in 1968, it instantly created a power vacuum and a politically 
fragmented region full of small states that also happened to be massively oil rich 
(Crystal 1990). The immediate task confronting the vulnerable AGS was the 
                                                 
4 John C. Wilkinson (1994: 95) states that ‘For most of the history of defining territories in Arabia, 
Britain has been the sole arbiter of boundaries.’  
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challenge of nation building. They had to learn from scratch how to deal with the 
political, social and economic intricacies of the modern world.  
The years from 1971 to 1990 mark the first phase of modernity for the Gulf. 
The sharp oil price increase in 1973 was the main catalyst for this second historical 
turning point. The policy emphasis was on nation building, breaking with the 
traditional mode of thinking, a sudden rush to upgrade and modernize the 
infrastructure to build the economy, and setting up a generous welfare state using the 
available oil revenue (Bulloch 1984). These states became simultaneously more 
important and certainly richer than they had ever been in all of their recorded history. 
The massive wealth associated with an oil price increase of no less than 400 per cent 
overnight transformed the societies of the AGS beyond recognition. The scope of the 
socioeconomic changes was far-reaching and the transformation is still continuing at 
an unusually high rate. But while triggering rapid socioeconomic changes, oil wealth 
has ironically led to political rigidity and consolidated the one-family political system. 
The combination of oil wealth and colonial legacy is the root cause of the 
centralization and personalization of authority in the AGS. Change and continuity 
remained the constant issue and the most enduring feature of that Gulf phase, with its 
logical contradiction of doing things in new ways while at the same time preserving 
the fundamentals of the old ways.  
The first phase of modernity also witnessed the downfall of the Shah in 1979 
and the gradual consolidation of the revolutionary Islamic Republic in Iran, which 
represented an unwanted challenge to the socio-political status quo in the more 
conservative AGS (Saikal 1980). The 1980s were rightly characterized as ‘the 
turbulent decade’ in Gulf history (Graz 1990). It was also a decade of lost opportunity 
as the price of oil dropped sharply, causing financial strain for the AGS. These states 
had to reorder their socio-political agendas, curtail important features of the generous 
welfare programmes, postpone lofty development goals and concentrate on defence 
and security matters, which topped the national priorities of the AGS as Iran and Iraq 
engaged in eight years of escalating military conflict. This war, dubbed ‘the longest 
war’ (Hiro 1990), was possibly the deadliest conflict in Gulf history and confirmed 
the proposition that when it comes to the Gulf, tensions and wars are the rule whereas 
cooperation and peaceful coexistence are the exception (Abdulla 1994). The eight 
years of that Gulf war were a violent reminder that the AGS live in a volatile region 
ready to explode at any time. 
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Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait confirmed this rather pessimistic view of the Gulf 
region. The shocking invasion on 2 August 1990 shattered the political innocence of 
the AGS. It raised immediate concerns and lasting questions regarding the territorial 
integrity and political viability of small states in the region, exposing the vulnerability 
of not just Kuwait but the other AGS including Saudi Arabia. However, the 1990s and 
2000s were also the years of the second phase of modernity in the Gulf, fuelled by the 
new oil boom. The primary policy imperative of these decades was quality education, 
a consumer economy, media and information technology advancement and the 
seeking of direct foreign investment and expertise.  
Two socio-political issues dominated the debate during this phase of 
modernity. The first was the gradual retreat of Kuwait, which had played a pioneering 
role during the first era of modernity, and the rise of the UAE/Dubai development 
model as the new trendsetter. The emergence of Dubai as the new hub and the centre 
of growth, innovation and modernity captured regional imaginations and heightened 
competition among the AGS for a fresh round of fast-track economic growth. The 
second issue was the rising demand for political reform and the relentless foreign 
pressure, mostly American, for greater democratization emanating from the tragic 
events of 9/11, which generated much public discussion and preoccupied policy 
responses. These two issues, as with the previous ongoing dichotomy of change and 
continuity, were never satisfactorily settled. The first decade of the new millennium 
brought its own opportunities and concerns, mostly associated with the forces of 
globalization. This is the global moment for the AGS, which has added yet another 
new set of socio-political issues on top of the old ones.  
These four phases are historical milestones for the AGS. No account of the 
Gulf moment is complete without an adequate understanding of the lasting impact of 
these turning points that have shaped the public consciousness, created many of the 
existing opportunities, influenced government decisions and sharpened the societal 
issues in the AGS. These states have had to face some daunting socio-political 
challenges, which confirm that the last four decades have not been luxurious but have, 
in fact, been extremely tough. Hence, the conventional wisdom that the AGS have had 
an easy time, acquiring massive wealth and enjoying a prosperous way of life while 
others were undergoing many hardships, is simply a gross misunderstanding of the 
complexity of the Gulf moment.  
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The historical trajectory is important but so is the regional context of which 
the AGS is an integral part. Three layers of regional forces have governed the 
evolution of the Gulf moment. These are the GCC, the Gulf Regional System (GRS) 
and the wider Arab Regional System (ARS). The AGS opted single-handedly and 
voluntarily in May 1981 to launch their own regional integration venture and establish 
the GCC. This was a timely response to the extraordinary regional events of 1979–80, 
which presented the AGS with formidable regional dangers. These detrimental events 
necessitated a higher level of security and political integration and cooperation. The 
GCC was a ‘political and security necessity but also would not have been possible 
without the deep socio-political and ideological affinity’ between the AGS, which 
share family and tribal ties, and political and cultural values and beliefs (Abdulla 
1999: 155). The formation of this integrative organization elevated local socio-
political issues to a regional level, and in the process made them more integrated than 
ever before. Thirty years since the creation of the GCC, these issues are now no 
longer local but regional, and hence much more complex in nature.  
Politically the GCC is only a subsystem of the GRS, which is composed of 
eight independent states: the six AGS plus Iraq and Iran. This systemic setup 
determines many of the political choices and pending security dilemmas confronting 
the AGS. It has never been easy for these newly independent small states to live next 
to Iran and Iraq, which are ambitious and often aggressive and expansionist 
neighbours. Iraq has already invaded Kuwait. Iran has been occupying three UAE 
islands since 1971, makes frequent threats against Bahrain and is engaged in a fierce 
competition for ideological and political domination with Saudi Arabia (Abdulla 
2006b). In such a danger zone, it is only natural that priority is given to regional 
security, which has invariably topped the national agenda of the AGS.  
Finally, the AGS are an integral part of the wider ARS and are deeply rooted 
in Arabic culture and history. These states pride themselves on being the cradle of 
Arabism, and see themselves as quintessentially more Arab in character than the rest 
of the Arab world. The AGS are historically, geographically and politically 
inseparable from the Arab world, and this determines many of the contemporary 
socio-political issues and much of the timeless cultural identity of the Gulf moment. 
Michael Hudson, the author of Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, notes that 
‘although the AGS developed sui generis, in so many ways it remains an organic part 
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of the Arab World and cannot remain indefinitely immune to the issues and problems 
of the wider region’ (Hudson 2006: 148).  
 
4. ISSUES OF THE MOMENT 
Of the host of new and old, fleeting and constant socio-political issues that engage the 
public, four stand out as the issues of the moment for the AGS.5 These are the issues 
of change and continuity, political reform and political stagnation, the agonizing 
contrast between the UAE and the Kuwait models of development, and finally the 
local versus the global. These issues are historically specific and delineate different 
phases of the Gulf moment. They also vary in intensity of debate and societal 
significance from one AGS to the other. Needless to say, all of these issues are 
interrelated and closely interconnected but each has an inner logic and a lifespan of its 
own.6  
 
4.1. Change versus continuity  
Of the four key issues of the moment, it is change and continuity that is certainly the 
oldest and the most intricate. It is also proving to be the most constant and is not 
likely to go away any time soon as it permeates all of the other issues.7 There are sure 
to be plenty of changes as well as plenty of continuities, but the perennial question 
often asked is how much of the new thinking is in essence old thinking and how much 
of the old thinking is still an integral part of the new thinking.  
The issue of change versus continuity is a very tricky one for the AGS since 
there are two diametrically opposing views on this topic. The first view states that 
everything has changed in the AGS, whereas the second claims that nothing has 
changed. Ironically, both readings are correct since there is ample evidence to support 
the change as well as the continuity paradigm.  
                                                 
5 While most of the socio-political issues discussed in this part of the paper are applicable across the 
board, they are more relevant to the smaller AGS. Hence reference to Saudi Arabia, which deserves 
separate treatment of its own, is noticeably infrequent. It is also worth mentioning that the aim is to 
introduce these issues as debated with limited effort to connect them analytically.  
6 This part of the paper depends heavily on issues discussed during the annual meetings of the Muntada 
al Tanmeya al Khaleeji (Gulf Development Forum, or DF). Most of these discussions are available in 
more than twenty books published in Arabic over the past thirty years. For more on the DF see 
www.df.ae.  
7The issue of change and continuity was the topic for discussion in the Thirteenth Annual Conference 
of Markaz al Emirat ll Dirasat wal Buhuth al Stratejeyah (Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research), Abu Dhabi, 2008. The papers are published by the centre under the title Al Khaleej al Arabi 
beena al Muhafazhah wa al Taghayeer.  
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It is almost self-evident that the AGS have gone through massive 
socioeconomic transformations that have been deep, been multifaceted and 
encompassed all aspects of life. Yet, and despite the fact that change is seemingly so 
obvious and so pervasive, there are still those who strongly believe that hardly 
anything meaningful or substantial has changed. Despite the abundance of change, a 
much greater degree of continuity is also visible in the socio-political landscape of the 
AGS. Change, as much as it is abundantly clear, is also ironically in considerable 
doubt. Many aspects of life have undoubtedly changed, and changed beyond 
recognition. The AGS have been experiencing more systemic and stressful changes 
than probably the rest of the Arab countries. On the other hand, many aspects of life, 
including values, institutions and relations, have resisted the forces of change. 
Therefore, when it comes to continuity versus discontinuity, that is to say what has 
and what has not changed in the AGS in recent history, the issue is vigorously debated 
and is legitimately surrounded with considerable controversy, which has led some to 
observe ‘the coexistence of mutually exclusive stereotypes of Gulf culture. One view 
is that the Gulf is a backward region, in which inadequate education, easy wealth, 
male dominance and persistence of tribalism have militated against cultural 
dynamism, so traditional cultural norms and practices persist. A contrasting view is 
that the AGS are super modern, with a rapid pace of globalization having thoroughly 
undermined traditional culture, replacing it with a cosmopolitan, international one in 
which women are leading the way’ (Springborg 2008: 9). 
 However, the continuity perspective, which asserts that hardly anything 
worthwhile has changed, is the more popular view. This line of thinking assumes that 
the AGS, beneath the façade of change, are essentially at the pre-modern stage of 
development as they have been for centuries. They are still in essence traditional 
societies wrapped in a façade of modernity. Traditionalism primarily governs political 
relations and determines social structure and the way these states attend to their daily 
business. Despite oil and oil wealth, modernity and globalization and massive 
exposure to the outside world, the AGS have remained virtually the same. Indeed, the 
net impact of the oil wealth of the 1970s and the 1990s has been the consolidation of 
the existing medieval order. Oil, in its own unique way, has strengthened the socio-
political status quo and the old frame of references, including the typically 
conservative and old-fashioned mode of thinking. Continuity rather than change has 
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emerged as the most desirable wisdom and popular choice. Tribalism, traditionalism 
and even unhealthy sectarianism are back and seem to be decidedly stronger.  
 According to this view the politically conservative regimes of the AGS are at 
this moment of Gulf history more conservative. That is also why the religiously 
inclined societies of the AGS today appear more religious and even more 
fundamentalist than they were during the pre-modern phase. Furthermore, the 
seemingly traditional and medieval socio-political settings of the AGS are now 
stronger as well as more enduring, denying in the process the early but ongoing 
pessimistic predictions regarding their longevity and stability. In brief, hardly 
anything changes in the AGS. When it comes to these states, it seems as though ‘the 
old way is the best way’. The AGS have been cogently resistant to change and most 
probably will remain so for years to come.  
 The hallmark of continuity is the centuries-old Gulf monarchies, which are 
entering their seventh generation. The ruling families of the AGS are the one constant 
pillar of the Gulf moment. They have survived tough challenges and emerged 
stronger, and have proved to be adept in the art of survival and ruling. Keen scholars 
have been forced to revisit their previous propositions and are now asserting that, 
‘While a generation ago scholars were forecasting the demise of the Gulf monarchies, 
more recent interpretations have come to appreciate the political strength of this form 
of government and are now predicting its longevity’ (Springborg 2008: 13). A similar 
verdict is cast by J. E. Peterson, who states that ‘For decades, the imminent demise of 
the monarchies of the Gulf has been predicted. They have been described facilely as 
anachronistic absolute monarchies in an age of republics and democratic aspirations. 
But the Gulf monarchies have confounded their critics, surviving both the challenge 
of the radical Left and, so far, that of the Islamic Right. Far from being fragile 
crumbling relics from the past, these young states have confronted the challenge of 
development and, in many respects, have matured and grown even stronger’ (Peterson 
1988: 1). 
The Gulf monarchies seem to be more powerful today than they were in all 
previous generations. Their legitimacy is hardly in doubt. In essence they still use 
Islam, tradition and tribalism as symbols of legitimacy as much as they rely on oil, 
socioeconomic achievements, modern administration and bureaucracy including state-
of-the-art security apparatus. The Al Saud ruling family of Saudi Arabia is more than 
two and half centuries old. Both the Al Sabah in Kuwait and the Al Khalifa in Bahrain 
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established their rule in the late eighteenth century. The Al Nahayan of the UAE came 
to power in Abu Dhabi in the 1760s. The Al Said family is part of a dynasty which 
ruled Oman as far back as 1700. The Al Thani clan of the small yet super-rich state of 
Qatar is the AGS monarchy with the shortest history in power, going back to 1868. 
Gregory Gause, the author of Oil Monarchies, says ‘It would be a serious mistake to 
underestimate their staying power or to assume that the only support for their rule is 
the protection of the US’ (Gause 1994: 146).  
 But the continuity viewpoint, while carrying some elements of truth, 
drastically underestimates the existence of forces of change in the AGS. These forces 
are rapidly gaining momentum; it is no longer convincing to argue that hardly 
anything changes in the AGS. Indeed it is not feasible to conduct ‘business as usual’ 
in what have become the highly open, globalized and massively modernized if not 
postmodernized societies of the AGS. 
 This is the essence of the second perspective on the issue of change and 
continuity. This view claims that the AGS have experienced more changes in the past 
fifty years than in their 500 years of recorded history. These states are pregnant with 
all types of changes, some deep-rooted and structural and some superficial and 
cosmetic. Changes in the AGS have not only been massive, but occurred at a 
tremendous pace. Change was inevitable after a series of important developments 
including the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the British withdrawal in the late 1960s, 
the sharp rise in oil prices in the 1970s, and the complete integration of the economies 
of the AGS into the world capitalist system in the 1980s and 1990s. These and similar 
historical turning points have unleashed a set of awesome socioeconomic forces that 
have profoundly ‘turned the AGS once and for all away from tribalism to modern 
state’ (Redha 1992: 11)  
The net result has been impressive. The largely traditional and conservative 
ways of life have been almost completely replaced. Old-fashioned uniformity has 
been superseded by a vigorous and prosperous diversity. A more modern, urban and 
distinctly affluent society is coming into being. Relatively diversified economies are 
now in full operation, with extensive links to the global financial and commercial 
markets. Importantly, there is now a better quality of life for the fast-growing 
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population of the AGS, including the hundred thousand Western expatriates who are 
benefiting from one of the most elaborate welfare systems provided tax-free.8  
Admittedly, change has not been without cost. Its disruption and negative 
impact have been just as discernible as change itself, and in some instances they have 
even been destabilizing. The effects include the unequal distribution of oil wealth, a 
considerable amount of psychological dislocation and disorientation resulting in 
increasing social alienation, growth of a highly individualistic culture, conspicuous 
consumption, a deepening of dependency and the presence of large number of 
foreigners. The expatriate community, mostly of Asian origin, is becoming virtually 
indispensable to the smooth running of the economy and the society as a whole, but in 
the process the citizens of the smaller AGS have been transformed into a disappearing 
minority in their own country. The side-effects notwithstanding, the AGS have 
experienced an ‘avalanche of changes’ which have engulfed policies, societies, 
infrastructure, values and economies, all of which are converting the AGS into 
postmodern societies geared to the world economy.  
 Change has been most visible in the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class, 
which represents a fundamental rupture with the past and is turning out to be one of 
the most permanent signs of change in the AGS. It is a sign of a modern and 
democratic future. This class has not yet pushed hard enough for its rightful share of 
political power. However, socio-politically there has already been a discernible shift 
of social power away from the old tribal leaders and business oligarchies, which are 
still around but have lost much ground as a social force for continuity. The existence 
of a well-established middle class is the most concrete proof of change. 
 The new Gulf is predominantly a middle-class Gulf,9 which is a formidable 
force behind the Gulf moment. This class, which barely existed in the pre-modern 
phase, is expanding exponentially in both size and influence. In terms of societal 
impact, the members of the middle class not only tend to act as the drivers for 
modernization, democratization, globalization, social mobility and entrepreneurship, 
but above all inject a healthy dose of rationality and political stability. This 
                                                 
8 The exception is the millions of manual labours and domestic workers, mostly from South-East Asia, 
who lack basic human rights and safeguards, as documented by various Human Rights Watch reports.  
9 This include Gulf nationals as well as non-nationals, as it is amply demonstrated by Syed Ali (2010). 
The prospects and challenges facing the rising ‘new Muslim Middle Class’ are the topic treated by Vali 
Nasr in his latest book, Meccanomics: The March of the New Middle Muslim Class (2010).  
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progressive and forward-thinking segment of AGS society is characteristically 
reformist and evolutionary, not revolutionary, in its thinking.  
Numerically, this class is the largest indigenous social group within Gulf 
society. They make up nearly 80 per cent of the total number of citizens in the AGS. 
In Saudi Arabia, ‘60–70% of the nearly twenty million citizens are members of the 
expanding middle class of varied income and life style’ (Seale 2010: 8). The majority 
of the Gulf middle class happen to be salaried bureaucrats and technocrats, heavily 
employed by government enterprises. But above all the Gulf middle class enjoy 
government affiliation, status and privileges. They are still timid, preferring job 
security and taking prosperity for granted. That is why they are just as politically loyal 
to the regime and to the ruling families as the old tribal class and the older generation. 
Indeed they are becoming even more indispensable to the outcome legitimacy of Gulf 
monarchies and the stability of the Gulf moment.  
No other class can generate as much of the needed resources as members of 
the burgeoning middle class, who are the very first in their families to be fully literate. 
Many of them also have specialized modern knowledge and skills and carry a degree 
from either a national or an internationally reputable university.10 They are active 
agents in the realm of the production of ideas, as much as they advance actions for 
and have careers in the state apparatus. Yet this group is not a homogeneous one with 
clear social and political agendas and roles in society. The middle classes in the AGS 
are made up of the new bourgeoisie, prosperous business people and entrepreneurs, 
bureaucrats, military and security officers, the intelligentsia, and professionals of all 
types, such as teachers, doctors and lawyers.11  
As for their attitudes and role in society, a recent survey reveals that the 
majority of the Gulf middle class think they are better off materially than the 
generation before, and feel secure in their jobs. They are generally confident and 
upbeat in their outlook about the future. Surprisingly, members of this class are 
satisfied with the education and health services provided by the state, are mostly 
positive about internal changes, and believe that hard work pays and brings 
achievements. In addition, the Gulf middle classes exhibit a high sense of national 
pride and tend to identify more closely with their own country than with Arabs or 
                                                 
10 There are some 110,000 students from the AGS enrolled in American, European and Australian 
colleges and universities, 80,000 of them from Saudi Arabia as of 2010, of whom 30,000 are women.  
11 The Gulf middle class would mostly fit the Western description of white-collar workers. 
17 
 
Muslims in general (Zogby 2007: 31–7). However, the Emirati middle class achieves 
the most satisfaction and enjoys the greatest social recognition from employment, 
feeling that hard work and ambition can bring career advancement. The Saudi middle 
class appears to be the most financially secure. The Bahraini middle class is ‘less well 
off, less optimistic and less confident and certainly the most troubled’ among their 
middle-class counterparts in the other AGS (Zogby 2007:  36).  
As the AGS economies have grown more prosperous over the last two 
decades, the sizeable Gulf middle class has also produced its own new generation, 
further consolidating change and even taking it to a higher social level. This new 
generation of the Gulf middle class is visibly more global in its lifestyle, IT skills, 
aspirations, spending habits and above all place of work. It is responsible for 
integrating the AGS into the global age; hence, whereas the previous generation were 
the pioneers of the modernity phases, the new generation of the middle class are 
agents of the global moment in AGS history. In addition, the new middle class prefer 
the private-sector and knowledge-economy jobs which are linked to the global 
economy, rather than being salaried bureaucrats and technocrats employed by the 
government. They are the urban-based creative and the talented class of the AGS.  
The fundamental difference between the old and the new Gulf middle classes 
is the difference between the local middle class and the growing global middle classes 
of the world. The mandate of the first is limited to local and national needs, whereas 
the other is completely focused on the growing requirements of the global moment 
and market.  
The younger generation of the Gulf middle class are probably just as global as 
the newly up-and-coming global middle classes, once confined to the triad of North 
America, Europe and Japan but rapidly expanding at a rate of 80 million people per 
year to become a global social trend of its own. Over time, as the economies of the 
AGS change, many basic values of the new Gulf middle class also appear to change. 
They start to acquire a set of socio-political views shared by the global middle class, 
such as assigning more importance to individual liberties, considering religion less 
central, holding more liberal social values, and expressing more concern about the 
environment and democratic institutions (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2009). 
However, it is not yet clear that this global middle class will be more receptive to the 
significantly large non-citizen community of the AGS. The dynamics of the evolving 
power relationships between these two social segments will determine the AGS’s 
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political future, including the notion of national identity and the issue of 
democratization. The possibilities are endless and almost impossible to predict; 
among them are a unique experience in the ‘blending of cultures’, a multicultural 
society, and the creation of global citizens with variations such as ‘Global Emirati’ as 
the first product of this cultural blend (Thekkepat 2010).  
Ultimately it is not the old or the new middle class but the Gulf monarchies 
that shape the future course and decide issues of change and continuity; they still 
remain the bedrock of continuity in the AGS. However, the middle class and the 
monarchy  coexist amicably with very few clashes even when the topic becomes as 
controversial as the issue of political reform. 
 
4.2. Political reform versus political stagnation  
The second socio-political issue of the moment is political reform versus political 
stagnation, intrinsically linked to the ‘change and continuity’ debate in the AGS. 
These issues are two faces of the same process, except that political reform is 
confined to the political sphere rather than the larger societal space. Structurally it is 
an immediate concern for the Gulf middle classes, who immensely value 
democratization but are politically impotent to carry it to its logical conclusion. 
Globally, the middle classes are among the largest social advocates of democracy and 
political participation, but the politically docile Gulf middle classes are timid about 
challenging the historical and institutional supremacy of the Gulf monarchies. The 
first true historical opening for political reform appeared when a younger generation 
of Gulf monarchies assumed power during the second modernity phase. These 
younger rulers, lacking the charisma of the older generation, recognized the need for 
institutional legitimacy to complement traditional and charismatic sources of 
legitimacy. They also found it politically convenient to respond positively to outside 
pressure, emanating mostly from Washington, in the light of the tragic events of 9/11. 
This democratic window of opportunity resonated well with the Gulf middle classes 
and the few local reform advocates who felt that it was an issue that could not be 
delayed indefinitely.  
Yet the political reform process turned out to be extremely ‘mute, patchy and 
halting’ (Abdulla 2006d: 6). Public demand never went beyond scattered articles, 
occasional conferences and a few cases of petitions signed by a handful of academics, 
intellectuals and human rights activists. Saudi Arabia has seen several high-profile 
19 
 
petitions explicitly demanding constitutional reform.12 They were promptly brought to 
the attention of the reform-minded King Abdulla bin Abdul Aziz, who responded 
favourably by initiating an ongoing national dialogue and taking the timely decision 
to go ahead with the first ever municipality election in Saudi Arabia during 2005 
(Abdulla 2004). That was the full extent of political reform seen in Saudi Arabia, 
although the eighty-six-year-old monarch has ‘set in train radical changes which are 
nothing short of revolutionary’ (Seale 2010: 8) in other areas, such as the media, 
women’s empowerment, civil liberties, education and economic and financial reform. 
In Bahrain, the better-organized opposition movements have the longest history of 
petitions and agitations, and forced the government of the newly crowned King 
Hamad Al Khalifa to declare a national accord and agree to establish a bicameral 
legislative body, one chamber of which is fully elected. Both Qatar and the more 
inward-looking Oman have seen similar cases of popular petitions and the occasional 
burst of local demands for constitutional reform, but little has happened apart from a 
few cosmetic institutional openings. As for the more globally disposed UAE, demand 
for political reform has always been flat and the government has never taken 
democratization seriously.  
This has been the full extent of the domestic demand for political reform, 
which soon lost its momentum and is unlikely to gain traction in the near future. Even 
the global financial crisis of 2008–9 did not lead to any visible political agitations in 
the AGS. External interests in democratization evaporated just as fast as they had 
bubbled up. The meagre political changes introduced by the Gulf monarchies during 
the second modernity phase are not yielding any significant institutions of democracy. 
The younger generation of Gulf monarchs are feeling secure and sufficiently 
legitimate to ignore early promises of democratic openings. All told, the spring of 
democracy in the AGS and indeed throughout the Arab world has turned out to be 
short-lived.13 There is a return to the old, non-democratic political systems and 
paternalistic political culture that appear as strong as ever. The prevailing thinking is 
that there is no genuine domestic appetite for political reform and a preference for the 
status quo. The AGS can afford to postpone democracy as long as they deliver on 
                                                 
12 The first of these petitions was the ‘Mudhakkarat al Nassiha’ (Memorandum of Advice) presented to 
King Fahd by 107 liberals and Islamist human rights activists in 1992.  
13 This is the final verdict of the second Arab Reform Initiative, in ‘The State of Reform in the Arab 
World 2009–2010’, which covers democratic transitions in eleven Arab states: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.  
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socioeconomic development and adhere to the welfare programmes as policy 
priorities.  
The logic of the governing system is simple: why enact political reform when 
the old social contract is still binding and almost all of life’s necessities are amply 
provided for? No one is genuinely interested in changing the political status quo when 
prosperity, security and stability are fully guaranteed. There are no grounds for 
political reform when 86 per cent of citizens in a country such as the UAE express 
strong satisfaction with their life and feel optimistic about the future.14 It should come 
as no surprise that the only domestic demand for reform is the occasional petition of 
questionable value that can be easily dismissed by governments who command wide 
loyalty among the citizens. Where there is no demand, there is no policy response and 
outcome; governments throughout history have not voluntarily initiated policies and 
undergone reform if the demand was lacking. It is commonly believed in the AGS 
that democracy is divisive and destabilizing; it breeds conflict and is proving to be 
synonymous with political instability. It is this innate fear of political instability that 
quietens demand for reform in the Gulf. The majority do not want to tamper with 
political and economic stability, even if this implies an indefinite postponement of 
democratic transformation. To put it succinctly, why scratch where it does not itch?  
It is not political reform but rather political stagnation that is the prevailing 
order in the AGS. According to the Arab Human Development Report, the AGS suffer 
from chronic freedom deficit (UNDP 2004). The report shows that the gap between 
the human development index and the political freedom index is larger in the AGS 
than it is in other Arab states. The AGS scored badly on the good governance index, 
which includes accountability, rule of law and level of corruption, on political 
stability and on government efficiency. Kuwait is considered among the better and 
Saudi Arabia the worst case in the region. Bahrain is the front runner when it comes 
to political participation, which includes political associations, frequency of elections 
and freedom of civil society. The 2010 Freedom House report classifies all the AGS 
as ‘not free states’, except for Kuwait, which is classified as ‘partially free’ (Freedom 
House 2010).  
Undoubtedly the AGS ‘made enormous strides on social and economic 
modernization but have almost totally neglected the political leg of modernity’. 
                                                 
14  See Al Khaleej, 5 April 2004, p. 1. 15 See also MacFarquhar (2005).  
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Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE are among the top fifty countries in the world 
according to the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP 2010). However, when it 
comes to freedom, democracy and political participation the AGS have an 
embarrassingly dismal standing. This invites the perennial question of how these 
economically flourishing states have been so ambivalent, politically frozen and almost 
completely uninterested in political modernization. Why is it that the AGS are able to 
meet the daunting challenges of economic globalization, yet cannot face up to the 
equally cumbersome demands of political globalization? In other words, what 
explanation is there for political stagnation, and why is there no cogent popular 
demand for reform in the AGS? 
There are no simple explanations of this dichotomy, and debate on political 
reform and political stagnation is inconclusive. It should be noted, however, that 
while the AGS are not democratic states, they are by no means despotic or overly 
repressive authoritarian regimes. They do not rely on unmitigated coercion and fear 
for survival. Rather, the preferred approach is a co-optation policy, which has been 
remarkably effective in pre-empting opposition and demand for reform. Despite the 
lack of political reform and a lukewarm attitude towards democratization, these states 
are in essence benevolent and paternalistic. The largely obedient tribal culture, which 
is unlikely to disappear soon, is heavily used by the Gulf monarchies to keep political 
loyalty to the sheikhs, emirs, sultans and kings of the AGS. This culture is typically 
consensual and patriarchal and does not allow for direct opposition. In addition, the 
AGS value highly their exceptional internal stability, which often militates against 
any call for radical change of the political status quo. Democracy seems to have been 
wittingly traded off for stability and security. This is greatly helped by the abundance 
of social liberty, especially in the smaller AGS. The citizens of these states enjoy a 
relatively high level of individual and social liberty which compensates for the lack of 
political participation.  
While these factors are very relevant, it is also possible that lack of active 
demand for political change in the AGS could be due to fear of the security apparatus. 
This is especially true in the case of Saudi Arabia. The heavy-handedness of the secret 
police looms large and impedes reform throughout the region. According to the 2004 
Arab Human Development Report, ‘the central role of the secret police force, with its 
stealthy and octopus-like reach, is the single biggest impediment to political reform 
throughout the Arab world’ (UNDP 2004).15 Certainly the security-conscious AGS 
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have prevented the emergence of political opposition, non-governmental 
organizations, human rights associations and labour unions. Lately, Islamist 
intellectuals and organizations in particular have been the main target of the security 
apparatus. The hunt for Islamists after 9/11 has become standard practice locally as 
well as regionally and globally. This in turn has scared other activists, who have 
become decidedly timid in their demand for change. State security’s encroachment 
into the affairs of civil society is among the many reasons responsible for the sharp 
reversal in the political reform movements in the AGS. 
Demand for reform has been additionally set back as a result of the general 
dissatisfaction with the perceived negative outcomes associated with the ongoing 
democratization transformation in places such as Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine and even 
Kuwait and Bahrain. These supposedly old and new democracies have revived 
sectarianism and produced violence, domestic instability, political strains, social 
setbacks and occasionally economic gridlock. The fruits of the first wave of political 
reform in the region have not been particularly appealing. Since democracy trickles 
down by example, the existing models have not provided a positive incentive. Iraq, 
which ran a successful election in 2010, stands out as the most frightening case of 
democratic transition. Instead of becoming a role model, Iraq has degenerated into a 
fragile state bordering on failed state status. According to the 2009 Global Peace 
Index, Iraq is ranked the least peaceful country in the world (Institute for Economics 
and Peace 2009). Lebanon is a unique case of confessional democracy that cannot be 
emulated by the AGS. Turkey is becoming an attractive case of moderation and 
Muslim democratization in the region, but it is demographically large and 
geographically too far away from the Gulf region. As for neighbouring Iran, its 
theocratic democracy and radical regime are not attractive to the mostly Sunni and 
conservative AGS. Kuwait was once a democratic pioneer but is no longer as 
appealing as it used to be in the second half of the twentieth century. Bahrain is a 
democratic newcomer which is turning unpalatably sectarian.  
When it comes to political reform, what has been badly needed is one credible 
case of democracy in the region. All the existing ‘democracies’ are externally driven 
and are not convincing. In the absence of a successful democratic role model, it is 
difficult for political reform advocates in the AGS to make a strong case for 
democracy. Indeed the role model in the region is not Kuwait, the oldest democracy, 
but rather the more global UAE, which, according to the Gulf Strategic Report (n.a. 
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2005), is ‘the least democratic of the AGS’. The supposedly best case of democracy, 
Kuwait, and the worst case of political participation, the UAE, have further 
complicated the issue of political reform in the AGS. 
 
4.3. Kuwait versus the UAE 
In the AGS region, Kuwait is currently full of political mobility, but it is the UAE that 
arguably has the most dynamic economy. As the UAE, most recently Abu Dhabi, 
goes from one economic success story to another, Kuwait seems to slide deeper into a 
vicious cycle of political crisis. The developmental gap between these two AGS is 
deepening by the day, yet both models have a profoundly negative impact on the 
political reform movement throughout the region.  
 Kuwait is highly admired for having the best written constitution among the 
AGS. Its lively democracy is certainly the oldest and the most institutionalized, and 
the fifty-seat Kuwaiti parliament is setting the standard for accountability, 
transparency and democratic maturity. No one doubts Kuwait’s democratic 
credentials. Its cogent political opposition is nearly always in full operation and uses 
the interpellation mechanism to extend parliamentary control over the executive 
branch, which has always been the exclusive domain of the ruling family (Salih 2006). 
 However, democracy, usually a messy affair, has made this previously 
progressive country look increasingly regressive and consumed by renewed political, 
tribal and sectarian tensions. Kuwait appears totally exhausted by internal bickering 
and experiences occasional government paralysis. An enduring political impasse has 
held back development of the economy and infrastructure. Paradoxically, the 
politically liberal Kuwait has adapted a heavily protectionist economic policy, unlike 
the politically autocratic UAE, which has opted for an open and laissez-faire 
economic approach. The ‘no confidence’ parliamentary tool has been overused and 
even abused to score personal goals at the expense of national priorities.16 Worse, 
Kuwait’s celebrated political mobility is preventing economic progress; the country is 
lagging behind in fulfilling its economic diversification plans and, unlike the other 
AGS, has done poorly in attracting direct foreign investments. Contrary to 
                                                 
16 Kam Salih states that ‘In the last ten years it was alleged that the exercise of interpellation was 
abused to the extent that it lost credibility as an effective supervisory instrument. It is generally 
observed that the majority of interpellations initiated in this period either focused on marginal issues or 
targeted certain personalities. This generated some instability and negatively affected the democracy 
process’ (2006: 44).  
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modernization theory, democracy in Kuwait has not generated a corresponding 
economic reform. The apparent setback of the Kuwait model is not confined to the 
economic sphere but is all-encompassing. The country is more conservative socially, 
more fundamentalist ideologically and more sectarian and tribal than it was during the 
1970s. Even in sport, where it was once the football champion in the Gulf, Kuwait is 
occasionally losing to newcomers like Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. This is 
considered particularly bad for Kuwait since sports events, according to Abdullah 
Baabood, ‘have become the most important contributors to national identity and 
regional status’ (Baabood  2008: 108).  
 Kuwait is still one of the most striking examples of democracy in action in the 
Arab world, but the behaviour of its legislators has made democracy totally 
perplexing and outright disappointing (Al Najar 2010). While Kuwait is certainly the 
role model for democratization, the UAE has evolved as a trendsetter for rapid 
economic growth. Ironically, this AGS stands as a sharp contrast to Kuwait as its 
ostensibly successful economic reforms have not led to any genuine democratic 
openings. The UAE has focused very clearly on business, and nothing but business. 
The result has been impressive. The UAE, followed closely by Qatar, is emerging as 
the fastest-growing economy in the Gulf region, with GDP exceeding $200 billion in 
2009.  
The UAE’s economic success is in no doubt but it has little to show in terms 
of political reform; it has been extremely slow to attend to the age of democracy. Its 
ageing Federal National Council (FNC) ‘is a big political liability for a supposedly 
progressive county like the UAE’ (Abdulla 2005). Even after the limited election 
introduced in 2006 and the appointment of several women as members, the FNC 
remains, embarrassingly, the weakest legislative body in the Gulf region (Shaheen 
2010). There is hardly any public discourse or political happenings of any sort in the 
county. The UAE is certainly an impressive economic power, but looks more like a 
political dwarf. Once again, this is an exceptional case that does not fit well with the 
basic tenets of the theory of modernity. For a county that claims to be the first in 
economic prosperity among the AGS, it is rather strange to be the last in 
constitutional and political reform.  
Despite their deep historical and socioeconomic similarities, the two AGS 
monarchies of Kuwait and the UAE have taken two diametrically opposing paths to 
economic and political modernity. However, neither of these two models makes a 
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strong case for democratization in the Gulf region. Each in its own unique way is 
making political reform a very complicated affair. However, for the AGS the choice is 
clear: it is the UAE, not Kuwait, which is the preferable model at this global moment 
in Gulf history. The economics of modernization and globalization wins over the 
more dicey political modernity.  
 
4.4. The global versus the local 
The UAE is not only asserting itself as the Gulf economic powerhouse but is 
relentlessly branding itself as ‘Global Emirates’ (Al Nahayan 2009) and acting as the 
epicentre of the global moment in Gulf history. Kuwait was the regional pioneer 
during most of the two phases of modernity, but it is the UAE that has emerged as the 
new motor of the region. The UAE also finds itself struggling the most with the issue 
of ‘global versus local’, the latest of the hotly debated socio-political issues to which 
some AGS are responding more enthusiastically than others. The UAE stands out as 
the most forthcoming, with the city of Dubai striving to be a global city and 
confirmed as the regional, financial and service hub.  
According to the 2008 KOF Index of Globalization, the AGS have been rated 
continuously as the most globalized Arab states. Not surprisingly, the UAE is ranked 
thirty-fifth worldwide, the most globalized among the AGS. Kuwait is the second 
most globalized AGS with a world ranking of fortieth, followed by Bahrain and 
Oman. However, when it comes to economic globalization Bahrain sets the standard: 
it is ranked seventeenth worldwide, whereas UAE society is considered as the twenty-
seventh most globalized in the world.17 These rankings confirm that the AGS are no 
strangers to global attention, and signs of globalization are found all over the region. 
Some of the AGS are amongst the most open and perhaps the most integrated within 
the world market, and have always been dedicated to privatization and free market 
ideas, the essential tenets of economic globalization.  
It is therefore no accident that, compared to other Arab states, AGS are well 
ahead in their initial response to globalization and are showing greater confidence in 
dealing with its prospects and risks. This is due in part to their history and geography, 
but more importantly it is also related to oil. Oil has forced the AGS to become 
directly involved in global affairs and thus become exposed to global influence. 
                                                 
17 http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/rankings_2008.pdf. 
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Because of oil, their vitality and centrality to global economics and politics remain 
high and are bound to increase measurably in the near future (Al Manief 2000) Oil 
heavyweight Saudi Arabia was the only Arab state invited to join the Group of 
Twenty (G20),18 established in 1999 to bring together systemically important 
industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in global economy and 
finance. However, the AGS had their first encounter with the forces of globalization 
during the Gulf crisis of 1990–1. This crisis epitomized how, in a densely 
interconnected world system, local decisions and regional actions could trigger global 
responses, and how the fate of a small Gulf state, Kuwait, could become intricately 
linked with the politics of superpowers thousands of miles away. The Gulf crisis 
served as a ‘powerful reminder that economic and political globalization is an 
inescapable fact of life and that the conventional separation between the internal and 
external is something of the past’ (Abdulla 2006a: 124).  
The AGS have realized that globalization is immensely beneficial and often 
glamorous. The economic gains of globalization are undoubtedly impressive, but 
surprisingly there are also heavy costs to going global. This is especially true with 
regard to the tremendous impact on the social fabric and the cultural identity of the 
AGS. The city of Dubai typically exemplifies the extremes of the global moment.  
Dubai, the second largest and most prosperous city in the UAE, with a 
population of 1.7 million inhabitants, is emerging at the forefront of the booming 
global cities of the AGS. Until recently the city, which is called by some the ‘City of 
Gold’ and by others the ‘kingdom of Bling’ (Barrett 2010), was ranked among the 
world’s fastest-growing cities. Established in 1832 by the Al-Maktoum family as an 
independent sheikhdom, Dubai steadily developed from a remote fishing enclave to a 
commercial town in less than a century. It has continued its gradual transformation 
into a prominent regional financial, trade and tourist hub in less than a half century. 
Dubai, which is considered ‘the world’s fastest city’ (Krane 2009), has under its 
current ambitious leader Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum managed to transcend 
its local and regional boundaries, and in less than a decade it has secured a presence 
as a regional business hub. It has overcome the misery of its past and frustrating 
                                                 
18 In ‘The Arab Tomorrow’, David Ottaway (2010: 7) asserts that ‘Saudi Arabia is the one new Arab 
powerhouse to have emerged as a player on the international scene. Its status as the world’s central oil 
bank – it has the largest reserves (267 billion barrels) and production capacity (12.5 million barrels a 
day) – and holder of massive dollar reserves ($395 billion in mid-2009) puts it in a unique position 
among the Arab states. The kingdom is the only Arab country in the Group of 20, the organization of 
the world’s major economic powers.’  
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regional circumstances to join a shortlist of the world’s most successful cities. These 
select cities are characterized by diverse populations and cultures that foster 
innovation and attract innovators in a secure and liberal social environment. 
Essential to its far-fetched dreams is Dubai’s attempt to establish the first post-
oil economy in the midst of the largest oil-producing and oil-exporting nations in the 
world. Oil currently accounts for only 7 per cent of Dubai’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), as opposed to 43 per cent in 1992. Dubai’s crude oil production also fell from 
400,000 barrels per day in 1990 to 300,000 barrels in 1995, and less than 100,000 
barrels in 2010.19 It became clear that the more oil declined, the more Dubai was 
forced to pursue the goal of building the first diversified economy in the Gulf. In fact, 
Dubai discovered that it was better off without oil. Signs of modernity and globality 
as well as affluence are visible in non-oil Dubai as they are in Riyadh, Kuwait, Doha, 
Abu Dhabi and other Gulf cities still heavily reliant on oil revenues. More 
significantly, the city has decided to build the first prototype knowledge-based 
economy in the Arab world. Dubai developed a reputation for being a pioneer when it 
comes to utilizing knowledge and innovative thinking. Its internet and media cities, as 
well as the more than twenty specialized free zone outlets, are nowadays replicated all 
over the region.  
In terms of identity, Dubai is no longer what it was just a short time ago – 
Emirati, Gulf, Arab, Islamic or Middle Eastern. In fact, it has hurriedly become a 
global city that is intricately connected to the economic, financial and commercial 
global network. The globalization of the city is reflected in indicators such as 
multinational companies and international banks headquartered in Dubai, as well as 
the city’s vast links with international commercial and financial centres. On the basis 
of these indicators, Dubai is included in the exclusive list of 111 global cities of the 
world.20 Similarly, the city was ranked twenty-seventh among the most globalized 
cities, according to the 2008 Global Cities Index.21 In 2009, Dubai was visited by 6.9 
million international visitors and was ranked eighth among the top most visited cities 
in the world. The city is also ranked twenty-fourth worldwide among the top evolving 
global financial centres. Many of these palatable global gains came to a sudden halt 
                                                 
19 Dubai Municipality, Dubai Essential Statistics 2010 (personal communication).  
20 For a list of world cities, see www. Diserio.com/gawc-world-cities.html.  
21 This includes twenty-four metrics across five dimensions: business activities, human capital, 
information exchange, cultural experience and political engagement. See 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/10/15/the_2008_global_cities_index. 
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during the severe 2008 global financial crisis. It was also shockingly revealed that the 
city had accumulated a debt of more than $80 billion, mostly used to inflate the real 
estate sector that proved to be the weakest link in the Dubai project (Al Qasimi 2009). 
Being one of the most globalized economies in the region, it was inevitable that Dubai 
was hit the most by the de-globalization processes of 2008–9. Its GDP dipped into 
negative growth for the first time in fifteen years and the vibrant local stockmarket 
lost more than 70 per cent of its value (Abdulla 2009a). The global credit crunch 
brought a pause to some of Dubai’s wildest ambitions to build the tallest, the biggest 
and the largest of everything. The city had to learn the hard way that while high 
dependence on global economy has many advantages, in moments of crisis its pains 
may prevail. When the entire international economic system goes through a period of 
massive disruption, it is inevitable that things get a little tough for everybody around. 
The 2008–9 financial crisis was momentarily a humbling experience for Dubai and 
the other regional advocates of globalization. But while the crisis exposed the city’s 
global vulnerability and forced it to be financially more responsible, it was not 
decisively crippling and things did not fall apart. The AGS economies proved to be 
resilient22 and it was far from the end of the Dubai entrepreneur role, which is very 
similar in its fundamentals to the Singapore model (Abdulla 2009b). All the vital 
signs, including the traditional re-export trade and the more dynamic aviation sector, 
indicate that the city is slowly inching towards economic growth while its 
infrastructure, tolerant social atmosphere and economic diversification plans leave it 
irreplaceable as a regional and global business hub (Abdulla 2009c).  
The gains and pains of going global are still visible and are not limited to 
Dubai or the UAE. Other AGS cities have feverishly joined the global moment and 
are emulating the essentials of the Dubai model, especially its adaption of 
international standards, economic diversification, free zone facilities and above all 
building a knowledge-based economy as an alternative to an oil-based economy. The 
2009 Arab Knowledge Report indicates that the AGS are leading in all of the four 
pillars of the knowledge economy: education, innovation, ICT and economic 
incentives and institutional regime (UNDP and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum 
                                                 
22 The World Bank in its June 2010 update to its Global Economic Prospect Report stated that ‘The 
high-income oil exporters AGS seem better placed to lead recovery for the broader MENA [Middle 
East and North Africa] region, as oil prices have traced an upward trend and financial conditions in the 
group are stabilising’ 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/EXTGBLPROSP
ECTSAPRIL/0,,menuPK:659178~pagePK:64218926~piPK:64218953~theSitePK:659149,00.html). 
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Foundation 2009). The UAE, which is ranked forty-third among 135 countries in the 
world, leads the AGS and the rest of the Arab world in terms of readiness for the 
knowledge economy, followed closely by Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.  
 The economic benefits are impressive, but Dubai is discovering that the social 
cost of globalization is also massive. It appears that the more global the city, the more 
it has lost touch with everything that is local, a process that includes the ‘loss of 
identity and the erosion of the ruling bargain’ (Davidson 2008: 193). As global 
symbols expand, the local socio-political components increasingly tend to shrink. In 
the case of Dubai the clearest manifestation of this dialectical process of the global 
versus the local is the demographic issue, which is so alarmingly skewed that it is 
virtually unsustainable. The citizens of Dubai are becoming a disappearing minority 
in their own city. Officially they make up 15 per cent of the total population. Worse is 
to come, as the percentage is expected to go as low as 5 per cent by 2020 and the 
prospect of a zero-per-cent local population is becoming almost unavoidable by 2025. 
This zero-per-cent eventuality looms larger by the day and is viewed as one of the 
most daunting pains of globalization. This situation is not limited to Dubai and the 
UAE, with citizens in Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain comprising 18 per cent, 31 per cent 
and 50 per cent of the population respectively.  
Sociologically, the demographic imbalance means that the city is made up of a 
small local minority and a large foreign majority. While on the surface there appears 
to be social harmony between the two communities, it is a different story underneath. 
The central social contradiction has to do with the fact that the minority enjoys all the 
privileges, while the majority does not get the privileges they would expect in modern 
societies. From the perspective of democratic theory, it does not look like a healthy 
situation if the majority of the people living in a country does not have a voice, while 
the minority, whether citizen or otherwise, has the right to determine the country’s 
future. This calls into question the social longevity as well as the political 
sustainability of the ‘business of Dubai is business’ project.  
Similarly, the national minority is growing deeply bewildered and tormented. 
On the one hand, most are well off and feel proud of the city’s global successes, no 
matter how vulnerable. This is probably the best moment in the city’s 170-year 
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history; after all, Dubai is recognized as the ‘first Arab Gulf tiger’.23 Yet sadly, at the 
moment when the citizens of Dubai should be celebrating, there is also deep fear of 
losing it all to the expanding expatriate population of 180 different nationalities 
occupying key positions in nearly all of the strategic sectors of the Dubai economy.  
Hence pride and fear live inside not just the disappearing citizens of Dubai and 
the UAE but also the other AGS citizens, who are going through a serious identity 
crisis and often raise the perennial question of the sustainability of the Dubai model 
and therefore of the future of the whole Gulf moment.  
 
5. THE GULF MOMENT: THE ROAD AHEAD 
The future direction will be largely decided by how successfully Dubai and the AGS 
deal with the complex socio-political issues and challenges: the global and the local, 
change and continuity, the old and the new, political reform and stagnation, and the 
evolving relationship between the entrenched Gulf monarchies and the modernizing 
Gulf middle class that is bound to become more assertive both socially and politically 
in the years to come.24 The AGS have managed to manoeuvre their way through these 
contentious issues remarkably well in the past four decades. How these pending 
socio-political issues are handled could determine not just the transition of the AGS 
towards good governance and a more prosperous post-rentier society, but ultimately 
their eventual emergence as the major centre of economic power, shaping the shifting 
landscape of Arab politics in the first half of the twenty-first century (El Halawany 
2010: 4–7). Geo-economically there is already a new map of the Arab world with the 
AGS attempting to play the leading role.  
The AGS have all the right attributes to advance their current regional pre-
eminence and assert their geo-political leadership. In a region full of violence, 
extremism and self-doubt, the AGS are the exception in terms of visible human 
capital advancement, social achievement, political stability, economic reform and 
regional and global vitality (n.a. 2009). They sit comfortably on top of 500 billion 
barrels of crude oil, nearly 40 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. At the current 
production rate this oil is presumed to last until 2160, and is figuratively worth a 
                                                 
23 ‘Dubai shares a number of characteristics with the Asia economic tigers including a sustained double 
digit economic growth rate during 1994–2007’ (Abdulla 2006c: 33).  
24 The future of the AGS was the topic of the twenty-eighth annual meeting of Muntada al Tanmeya, 
held in Bahrain in February 2008. The conference discussed the various future scenarios of the AGS 
put forth by the world economic forum. The full proceedings are published in Rumayhi (2010).  
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massive fortune of $40 trillion, more than the total GDP of the USA, China and all of 
the EU combined. It is also projected that the AGS will be accumulating a net surplus 
of more than $3.5 trillion by 2015, and based on IMF calculation the AGS GDP is 
expected to reach $2 trillion by 2020. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, which 
ranked the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority as the largest sovereign wealth fund by 
assent in the world in 2010, also estimates that the combined sovereign wealth fund of 
the AGS stands currently at $1.3 trillion, which is more than 37 per cent of total 
global sovereign wealth funds.25 Furthermore, these states are well ahead in human 
development measures and readiness for the knowledge economy. In terms of social 
and material well-being, the continuous prosperity of the AGS is in no doubt and the 
road ahead for the Gulf moment is rather promising. It is also reasonable to expect 
that the Gulf middle class will grow more potent over the next ten years to demand a 
modicum of institutional and political reform. This will enhance economic prosperity, 
internal order and stability, and further consolidate the Gulf moment in Arab history.  
A 2007 World Economic Forum (WEF) study confirms this rather optimistic 
outlook. The report presented three possible future scenarios for the AGS; two of 
them range between being optimistic and very optimistic over the next twenty years. 
The first is the Oasis scenario, where regional stability continues to be a challenge for 
the AGS, which are nevertheless able to achieve substantial institutional reforms. 
These states develop strong regional identity and work together to coordinate 
diplomatic and economic policies through technocratic governance and a stronger 
internal market. The second is the Sandstorm scenario, which describes a future where 
regional instability is the defining factor affecting the ability of the AGS to carry out 
effectively the necessary institutional reforms. This scenario sees a number of factors 
that make the surrounding region significantly turbulent, including military conflict 
involving the US, Israel and Iran. The final Fertile Gulf scenario essentially predicts 
the rise of the AGS as innovation hubs in a global environment characterized by 
robust demand for energy and increasing globalization. Regional stability gives the 
AGS the opportunity to focus on enhancing their human capital at all levels, investing 
heavily in education while at the same time proceeding carefully with energy and 
economic diversifying and with political and institutional reforms to support their 
growing economies and societies (WEF 2007). Some AGS, namely the UAE and 
                                                 
25 http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/. See also Gulf News, 24 April 2010, p. 29.  
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Qatar, are even expected to be at the cutting edge of the Global Redesign Initiatives 
launched in Doha in 2010 (WEF 2010) and have massively invested in the much-
anticipated new economy of the twenty-first century to replace the rentier economy of 
the twentieth.  
Whether the future is the oasis, the sandstorm or the fertile scenario, it appears 
that the Gulf moment is here to stay and flourish for a long time to come. Over the 
next decade the AGS will continue to draw the world’s attention, not just because of 
its huge energy potentials but also because of its global financial clout, expanding 
capital markets, innovative cities and growing regional impact. Even the 2008 global 
financial crisis did not shake the ambitious developmental plans of the AGS.26 They 
have made it to this point, and there is no reason why they cannot attend to the critical 
issues and challenges of the global phase of the Gulf moment in Arab history.  
                                                 
26 See the following official documents, all available on the net: The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, 
Bahrain 2030, UAE National Charter 2021.  
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